Humor, War

Be ALL You Can Be

All racist, hetero-sexist, cis-gendered, testosterone-poisoned, toxic-masculinist, Christophile White males are required to sign up and join to DIE for Globohomo, saving the Feminazis, protecting the DIE (Diversity Inequity & Exclusion) parasites and uplifting the Trannies and Affirmative Reactionary Niggardlies.


Yup! Sign me up.

I have got a spare life to lose.

Har! Har! Har! Har!

Here, at the end of the US Army psy-op video, is the real target of this propaganda: clip_image004

Come on, buddy! Only U can do it.

The Trannies, Lezzies, Faggots, Feminazis, fat slobs, low IQ Blacks & Mulla-toes and obese Black Single Mothers of the US Armed Forces ain’t gonna fight the Russkies and the Chinamen.


Be ALL you can be!

You too can become a future discarded Veteran that populate the homeless shelters of the Ole US of A, or die of a Fentanyl overdose.

IF, you have been lucky enough not to have your balls blown up in the Ukraine, in Taiwan or some other God forsaken place.


Globohomo is getting ready for WW III.

Politics, War

Military Force Generation

Here is something interesting that I think you will like.

It is about a society’s ability to mobilize for war.

There is always something new and useful to learn.

As usual the yellowing is my ow editorializing.

A Brief History of Military Force Generation

One of the peculiarities of European history is the truly shocking extent to which the Romans were far ahead of their time in the sphere of military mobilization. Rome conquered the world largely because it had a truly exceptional mobilization capacity, for centuries consistently generating high levels of mass military participation from the male population of Italy.

Caesar brought more than 60,000 men to the Battle of Alesia when he conquered Gaul – a force generation that would not be matched for centuries in the post-Roman world.

After the fall of the Western Roman Empire, state capacity in Europe deteriorated rapidly. Royal authority in both France and Germany was curtailed as the aristocracy and urban authorities grew in power. Despite the stereotype of despotic monarchy, political power in the middle ages was highly fragmented, and taxation and mobilization were highly localized. The Roman capacity to mobilize large armies that were centrally controlled and financed was lost, and warfare became the domain of a narrow fighting class – the petty gentry, or knights.

Consequentially, medieval European armies were shockingly small.

At pivotal English-French battles like Agincourt and Crecy, English armies numbered less than 10,000, and the French no more than 30,000. The world historical Battle of Hastings – which sealed the Norman conquest of Britain – pitted two armies of fewer than 10,000 men against each other. The Battle of Grunwald – in which a Polish-Lithuanian coalition defeated the Teutonic Knights – was one of the largest battles in Medieval Europe and still featured two armies that numbered at most 30,000.

European mobilization powers and state capacity were shockingly low in this era compared to other states around the world. Chinese armies routinely numbered in the low hundreds of thousands, and the Mongols, even with significantly lower bureaucratic sophistication, could field 80,000 men.

The situation began to shift radically as intensified military competition – in particular the savage 30 years’ war – forced European states to at last begin a shift back towards centralized state capacity. The model of military mobilization shifted at last from the servitor system – where a small, self-funded military class provided military service – to the fiscal military state, where armies were raised, funded, directed, and sustained through the fiscal-bureaucratic systems of centralized governments.

Through the early modern period, military service models acquired a unique admixture of conscription, professional service, and the servitor system.

The aristocracy continued to provide military service in the emerging officer corps, while conscription and impressment were used to fill out the ranks. Notably, however, conscripts were inducted into very long terms of service. This reflected the political needs of monarchy in the age of absolutism. The army was not a forum for popular political participation in the regime – it was an instrument for the regime to defend itself from both foreign enemies and peasant jacqueries. Therefore, conscripts were not rotated back into society. It was necessary to turn the army into a distinct social class with some element of remoteness from the population at large – this was a professional military institution that served as an internal bulwark of the regime.

The rise of nationalistic regimes and mass politics allowed the scale of armies to increase much further. Governments in the late 19th century now had less to fear from their own populations than did the absolute monarchies of the past – this changed the nature of military service and at last returned Europe to the system that the Romans had in millennia past. Military service was now a form of mass political participation – this allowed for conscripts to be called up, trained, and rotated back into society – the reserve cadre system that characterized armies in both of the world wars.

In sum, the cycle of military mobilization systems in Europe is a mirror of the political system. Armies were very small during the era where there was little to no mass political participation with the regime. Rome fielded large armies because there was significant political buy-in and a cohesive identity in the form of Roman citizenship. This allowed Rome to generate high military participation, even in the Republican era where the Roman state was very small and bureaucratically sparse. Medieval Europe had fragmented political authority and an extremely low sense of cohesive political identity, and consequently its armies were shockingly small. Armies began to grow in size again as the sense of national identity and participation grew, and it is no coincidence that the largest war in history – the Nazi-Soviet War – was fought between two regimes that had totalizing ideologies that generated an extremely high level of political participation.

That brings us to today. In the 21st century, with its interconnectedness and crushing availability of both information and misinformation, the process of generating mass political – and hence military – participation is much more nuanced. No country wields a totalizing utopian vision, and it is inarguable that the sense of national cohesion is significantly lower now than it was one hundred years ago.

Putin, very simply, could not have conducted a large scale mobilization at the onset of the war. He possessed neither a coercive mechanism nor the manifest threat to generate mass political support. Few Russians would have believed that there was some existential threat lurking in the shadow – they needed to be shown, and the west has not disappointed. Likewise, few Russians would likely have supported the obliteration of Ukrainian infrastructure and urban utilities in the opening days of the war. But now, the only vocal criticism of Putin within Russia is on the side of further escalation. The problem with Putin, from the Russian perspective, is that he has not gone far enough. In other words – mass politics have already moved ahead of the government, making mobilization and escalation politically trivial.

Above all, we must remember that Clausewitz’s maxim remains true.

The military situation is merely a subset of the political situation, and military mobilization is also political mobilization – a manifestation of society’s political participation in the state.

PS       Alesia  was ONE of the wars the Roman could deal at the same time.

Politics, War

Russian Fireworks in Kyiv

Air alert announced in Kyiv

MOSCOW, October 12 – RIA Novosti.

The air alert was again announced in Kyiv, the city authorities reported on Telegram.

“An air alert has been declared in Kyiv,” the city administration said.

Panorama of evening Kyiv. October 11, 2022


This morning, the Ukrainian media reported that an air alert had been declared in the southern and central regions of the country. Besides, in Nikolaev and area explosions were distributed.

In the evening, an air alert was also announced in the Vinnitsa region. According to Rada deputy Aleksey Goncharenko, air defense systems were operating in the region. Also, according to media reports, explosions were heard in the area.

Also today, the head of the Dnipropetrovsk region, Valentin Reznichenko, said that the Russian military had dealt a new blow to the energy infrastructure of the region. According to him, there was a “strong fire and destruction” at the “life support enterprise”.

In addition, two districts of the Sumy region were left without electricity after artillery strikes, Dmitry Zhivitsky, head of the regional administration, wrote on Telegram.

On Monday and Tuesday, the Russian Armed Forces conducted massive strikes with precision-guided weapons on Ukrainian infrastructure facilities. The Ministry of Defense notes that all designated targets have been hit. As Vladimir Putin emphasized on October 10 at a meeting with permanent members of the Security Council, this is a response to the terrorist attack on the Crimean bridge organized by Kyiv and other attacks on civilian facilities in Russia.

According to Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Galushchenko, about 30 percent of the country’s energy infrastructure has been hit over the past two days. Damage to electrical equipment was reported due to missile strikes at the Ladyzhynska TPP in the Vinnytsia region. In addition, one of Ukraine’s largest mining companies, Ferrexpo, has suspended operations due to power outages. Also in Ukraine, almost half of the trains are delayed.

Politics, War

The Elites fake VAXX

As we all suspected even before the likes of Boris Johnson were being
publicly “vaccinated” by syringes with the cap on, it appears that a significant portion of the corporate elite may have arranged to avoid the experimental gene therapies to which the masses were repeatedly subjected.

Jose Maria Fernandez Sousa-Faro, president of European pharmaceuticals giant PharmaMar, has been charged by police with being falsely vaccinated against Covid-19. Dr. Sousa-Faro has been caught up in a scandal in Europe involving people being added to the National Immunization Registry in exchange for large sums of money, with many of them familiar faces and household names.

Police allege that Sousa-Faro arranged to be injected with a saline solution instead of a Covid-19 vaccination and paid thousands of dollars to have his name added to Spain’s immunization register, as confirmed by police sources and reported by El Periodico de Espana.

Dr. Sousa-Faro is among more than 2,200 celebrities and European elites on the list drawn up by National Police of those falsely vaccinated against Covid. According to El Mundo, Spanish police carried out the investigation called Operation Jenner which uncovered the vast network of celebrities and elites who have paid money to have their names fraudulently entered on the National Immunization Register, despite refusing to be vaccinated.

The leader of the network was a nursing assistant at the La Paz University Hospital, where he is accused of charging more than €200,000 euros for fraudulently registering 2,200 people as vaccinated in the National Registry against Covid-19. He has been arrested and is currently in custody.

On a surprise scale of 1 to 100, this is about a 4. It was fairly obvious that the globalist elites were getting saline because they haven’t been dropping dead at the same rate as ordinary people. About the only thing I find surprising is that it doesn’t appear to have been officially organized by some high-level WHO agency.

I suspect at least twice as many people are unvaccinated as are presently believed to be.

Short Version;

Nutcase Conspiracy theorists proved RIGHT … again.

Politics, War

Ukrainian Army is collapsing

Devastation of Ukraine. Real prospects for mobilization and war

05/16/2022, 08:29

Judging by the latest reports from the Ukrainian front and from the Ukrainian rear, the long-awaited collapse of the Ukrainian army has begun. They counted on him unjustifiably already in the first phase of the special operation

Three factors contributed to this:

statements by Russian volunteers and militiamen of the DPR/LPR who fought in 2014-2015 that the Armed Forces of Ukraine can be thrown with hats (they were not cunning, they thought so);

• statements by pseudo-pro-Russian politicians from Ukrainian emigration and the Kyiv opposition that there are few Nazis in Ukraine, and the rest of the population (including the security forces) can not wait for release (these were cunning, since only the Russian army could return them to power, so they needed any to lure her to Ukraine at a price);

• the confidence of the majority of Russians, including the leadership of some law enforcement agencies, that the Russian people living in the South-East of Ukraine cannot support the Kyiv regime and will not fight against Russia.

This calculation contradicted the known facts. It was the army, the SBU and the border troops who were the first to betray Yanukovych, even before his flight from the country, in fact, ensuring the victory of the Maidan. The border guards tried to arrest their president and supreme commander, and the army air defense threatened to shoot down his helicopter. The SBU, on the other hand, provided the nationalists who hunted the president with information about his movements. Finally, during the entire period of hostilities in the Donbass, in which the army was drawn into without much reflection, a few Ukrainian servicemen went over to the side of good (less than a hundred in eight years). The rest fought well. Even of the Berkut fighters, who opposed the Maidan and the Maidan hated for the longest time, only a minority went to Russia together with their regions or personally, and the vast majority remained to serve the Nazis, despite the disbandment of their units.

Since the army’s devotion to the regime turned out to be much higher than expected, the Kyiv authorities were able to stabilize the front for several months. But here they, along with their Western allies and advisers, fell into their own trap.

The ABC of military art demanded from the Ukrainian army a slow, fighting retreat from the Donbass and, in general, from the entire Left Bank to the Dnieper (from line to line), with the task of inflicting the greatest possible losses on the advancing Russian troops and, to the extent possible, maintain the combat capability of their troops deployed in the left-bank regions. Formations from Western Ukraine and the reserve brigades that were being formed had to be pulled up to the Dnieper, and it was advisable to deploy military equipment received from the West on the same line.

It should be borne in mind that at the time of the outbreak of hostilities, the Ukrainian army numbered 260,000 people. Together with the border troops, the National Guard and special units of the SBU – up to four hundred thousand. At least one hundred thousand people were called up in four waves of mobilization. At least two hundred thousand received weapons and were enlisted in the territorial defense brigades. Even taking into account the inevitable losses and the need to keep part of the troops on the Belarusian, Polish and Moldovan (Transnistrian) borders, the Kyiv regime could theoretically concentrate 500-600 thousand people on the Dnieper, which is two or three times higher than even the current grouping of Russian troops.

Many may say that the Dnieper did not stop the troops of the Red Army in 1943, and today the Russian army has much greater capabilities. But the fact is that more than two and a half million people fought in the four Ukrainian fronts and the Black Sea Fleet, which gave almost twofold superiority over the troops of Army Groups “South” and “A” defending in Ukraine. Accordingly, the Soviet command could simultaneously organize the crossing of the river in different places, and the Germans simply did not have enough reserves to plug the numerous holes in their defenses.

In our case, the defending enemy, covered by a wide river, would also have a significant numerical advantage, which would force the Russian command to determine one point for the formation of the river and concentrate most of the available troops there, practically exposing the rest of the front. It would be difficult to repeat the offensive from Belarus to Kyiv – the effect of surprise would no longer work, and breaking through a narrow defile through a swampy area limited by a group is an extremely difficult task. Even if the Armed Forces of Ukraine did not try to eliminate the Kherson bridgehead (having much more forces for this than now), the offensive from it was obvious and expected, respectively, Odessa-Nikolaev.